Truthdig
Dereliction of Duty, Redux
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/dereliction_of_duty_redux_20170412/
Posted on Apr 12, 2017
By Scott Ritter
The guided-missile destroyer USS Porter launches a Tomahawk land attack
missile aimed at Shayrat air base in Syria on April 6. (Mass Communication
Specialist 3rd Class Ford Williams / U.S. Navy via AP)
In 1997, HarperCollins published "Dereliction of Duty," a book by a major in
the United States Army named H.R. McMaster. Veterans of the Gulf War knew
McMaster for his heroism in defeating Iraqi armored forces in what became
known as the "Battle of 73 Easting." Students at the U.S. Military Academy
at West Point knew him as a history teacher par excellence. However, it was
McMaster's 1997 book, a reworking of his 1992 doctorate thesis, that put him
on the map.
"Dereliction of Duty
(http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/07/20/reviews/970720.20spectot.html) "
eviscerated the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and that organization's poor
working relationship with the civilian leadership of both the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations. In particular, McMaster lamented the loss of direct
access by the JCS to the president during the Kennedy/Johnson years, and the
resulting abdication of decision-making influence to the secretary of
defense and individual military advisers who would tell the president what
he wanted to hear.
In the intervening 20 years, McMaster's reputation as a scholar-warrior has,
if anything, grown. A successful combat tour in Iraq as a regimental
commander was seen by many as a model for others to emulate, and provided
McMaster with entry into the inner circle of Gen. David Petraeus
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Petraeus) at a time when Petraeus was
rewriting the U.S. military's counterinsurgency doctrine that would guide
America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. McMaster played a major role in the
revision of the relevant field manuals and, later, as director of concept
and development learning, helped shape the Army's overall doctrinal thinking
for decades to come. Following the firing of President Trump's first choice
for national security adviser, Mike Flynn, Trump selected McMaster, by this
time a lieutenant general, to be Flynn's replacement.
On paper, the erudite McMaster seemed like an ideal choice, especially in
the wake of the obviously unqualified Flynn. But there were whispers of
concern about the nature of McMaster's relationship with the president.
Trump seemed overly enamored with McMaster's reputation. This infatuation,
combined with the hero-worship reverence Trump showed retired Marine Corps
Gen. James "Mad Dog" Mattis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Mattis) ,
set the scene for history to repeat itself: An insecure president-possessing
an inherently low opinion of the military ("I know more about ISIS than the
generals do, believe me," Trump famously quipped), and unwilling to hear
divergent opinions on issues he had already made up his mind on-was now
turning to a small group of military insiders who seemed inclined to tell
him what he wanted to hear, as opposed to what he needed to know. McMaster,
who literally wrote the book on this kind of failure of leadership, was now
poised to commit the same dereliction of duty for which he once pilloried
his predecessors.
During the night of April 6, Trump ordered a pair of U.S. Navy destroyers
operating in the eastern Mediterranean Sea to launch 59 Tomahawk cruise
missiles against targets located in and around the Syrian air base of
Shayrat. The cruise missile attack was in response to allegations of a
chemical weapons attack by a Syrian SU-22 fighter bomber operating out of
Shayrat airfield on the morning of April 4 against targets in the town of
Khan Shaykhun. The Syrian attack reportedly killed more than 100 people,
including many children.
Images and video of dead and dying victims quickly made their way, via
Syrian anti-government media activists including the well-known "White
Helmets" rescue organization, to Western media outlets, where they were
featured in breaking news stories over the course of the next two days. The
activists claimed the victims had been exposed to a chemical agent released
by weapons dropped by the Syrian aircraft. Initial assessments based on
analysis of the images provided by the activists, together with statements
made by people who claimed to have witnessed the events in question,
indicated that the chemical nerve agent used was sarin.
Medical personnel, both those working in support of anti-regime rebels in
Idlib province, where Khan Shaykhun is located, and in Turkey, where scores
of victims were evacuated for treatment, likewise stated that the symptoms
exhibited were consistent with exposure to an organophosphate chemical such
as sarin. Blood samples-which could more specifically identify the chemical
the Khan Shaykhun victims were exposed to-were drawn from victims by both
the rebels and Turkish medical authorities and turned over to international
investigators. Similarly, soil samples collected by rebels at the scene of
the attack were turned over to international authorities. The lack of a
defined evidentiary chain of custody for these samples, however, all but
negates their utility toward any definitive resolution of what happened at
Khan Shaykhun.
The Syrian government, together with its Russian allies, denied using
chemical weapons against Khan Shaykhun, stating that the Syrian armed forces
did not possess such weapons. The Russian defense ministry went further,
stating that the Syrian Air Force had bombed what it thought was a rebel
ammunition and weapons depot and that chemical agents stored in this depot
leaked out, causing the casualties. The rebels deny the existence of any
such depot, let alone a cache of chemical weapons.
The U.S. and its European allies have universally dismissed the Russian
claim. While Russia and the Syrian government have provided evidence of both
the possession and manufacture of chemical agents by anti-government rebels,
including sarin nerve agent, the Russian counterclaim is virtually
impossible to verify, especially since the site is under exclusive rebel
control, and no independent investigators have been granted access to the
area.
The Trump administration has unabashedly endorsed the rebel claims of Syrian
government responsibility.
"It is in the vital national security interest of the United States," Trump
said in a statement following the April 6 cruise missile strike, "to prevent
and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons. There can be no
dispute that Syria used banned chemical weapons, violated its obligations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and ignored the urging of the
U.N. Security Council."
The president was even more specific about the weapon used-a "deadly nerve
agent" that "choked out the lives of helpless men, women and children."
Trump's statement was striking, because it enshrined as fact that the
government of Syrian President Bashar Assad violated its international
obligations regarding the possession and use of a "deadly nerve
agent"-sarin. Trump's statement also carved in stone the proposition that
preventing this kind of activity was a "vital national security interest"
worthy of war.
This certainty drove the president to authorize an act of war, where the
United States undertook armed aggression against a sovereign state. A key
question that has emerged in the aftermath of the missile attack is whether
the president complied with U.S. and international law in ordering it.
The Founding Fathers granted Congress the exclusive power to declare war
through Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution. The
president, whom Congress named commander in chief of the armed forces in
Article II, Section 2, has the exclusive power to direct the military
following any declaration of war by Congress. Moreover, the Supremacy Clause
(Article IV, Section 2) declares that treaties made under the authority of
the Constitution are an integral part of the supreme law of the land to
which all Americans are subject.
While the above seems pretty straightforward, in reality the issue of war
powers as they are applied to both U.S. constitutional and international law
becomes pretty muddy, pretty fast. First and foremost, Congress, through the
passage of the War Powers Resolution
(https://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php) of 1973, ostensibly sought to
codify this constitutional language by limiting a president's ability to
take the nation to war to cases where Congress had declared war, or through
other statutory authorization, or in case of a national emergency created by
an attack on the United States, its territories, possessions or armed
forces.
Congress, however, through the specific language of the resolution, actually
abdicates its role in authorizing war. The president has virtually unlimited
powers to commit America's military into combat for periods of up to 90
days, so long as he sends a notification to Congress within 48 hours of any
such decision being implemented. Trump complied with this requirement,
through a letter to the speaker of the House and the president pro tempore
of the Senate, on April 8. He declared that he directed the attack "pursuant
to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander
in Chief and Chief Executive." He put Congress on notice that "[t]he United
States will take additional action, as necessary and appropriate, to further
its important national interests."
While Trump contended his letter was in conformity with the War Powers
Resolution (Public Law 93-148), some members of Congress countered that,
while the president did well to inform Congress of the attack within the
48-hour window required by law, he would need an "Authorization for Use of
Military Force (http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/1276 ;) " if, as
Trump noted in his letter, he was planning on any "additional action." The
political reality, however, is such that once American forces are placed in
harm's way, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where Congress would do
anything other than provide the president with the statutory authority
required to wage war for the duration of the conflict in question.
Nitpicking aside, the president appears to have acted within the intent, and
most probably the letter, of the law.
The situation vis-a-vis international law is murkier. Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter (which, having been duly ratified by the U.S. Senate
as a treaty, became the "supreme law of the land" in this country) holds
that the Security Council (http://www.un.org/en/sc/) is the sole arbiter
with regard to determining the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of peace, or act of aggression, and as such is uniquely empowered with the
right to authorize the use of force, under Article 42 of Chapter VII.
The U.S. did call for an emergency meeting of the Security Council prior to
Trump's order for the attack on Syria. However, no resolution was passed
under Chapter VII that authorized the use of military force. The U.S.
ambassador to the U.N., Nikki Haley, put the members of the Security Council
on notice, declaring, "[I]n the life of the United Nations, there are times
when we are compelled to do more than just talk. There are times we are
compelled to take collective action. This Security Council thinks of itself
as a defender of peace, security, and human rights. We will not deserve that
description if we do not rise to action today."
Haley chastised Russia, which as a permanent member wields a veto that could
prevent any Chapter VII authorization of force against Syria, noting that
"[j]ust a few weeks ago, this Council attempted to hold Assad accountable
for suffocating his own people to death with toxic chemicals. Russia stood
in the way of this accountability." Haley was referring to a February 2017
resolution condemning Syria for allegations it used chlorine weapons against
rebel forces on three occasions between 2014 and 2015. The findings were
based on a report by the U.N. Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) that was
challenged by the Russians, who criticized the JIM's repeated citation of
nonscientific, highly politicized sources closely affiliated with the rebel
forces. Russia viewed the resolution as a political exercise, and, together
with China, vetoed it.
Given the gravity of the situation in Khan Shaykhun, as conveyed by Haley,
similar inaction was not an option. "The question members of this Council
must ask themselves," Haley declared, "is this: If we are not able to
enforce resolutions preventing the use of chemical weapons, what does that
say for our chances of ending the broader conflict in Syria? If we are not
able to enforce resolutions preventing the use of chemical weapons, what
does that say about our effectiveness in this institution?"
Haley answered her own question: "When the United Nations consistently fails
in its duty to act collectively, there are times in the life of states that
we are compelled to take our own action."
There is no authority under the U.N. Charter for nations to undertake
unilateral military action. Indeed, the very purpose of the United Nations
as an organization is to prevent unilateralism in all its forms, especially
armed aggression. Strictly speaking, void of any Chapter VII authorization,
the U.S. cruise missile attack on Syria represents a de facto violation of
international law. Both the president's speech on April 6 and Haley's
address to the Security Council presented any American intervention in Syria
in response to a chemical weapons attack as a mandatory duty under
international law.
No nation is required under international law to forego its right to
self-defense. Article 51 of Chapter VII goes further, speaking of "the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
against a Member of the United Nations occurs." Syria did not attack either
the United States or American personnel and property. However, a case could
be made for "collective self-defense" under Article 51 if the U.S. was
formally aligned with those who were attacked, or if the people who were
attacked were afforded status as "members of the United Nations."
While no formal effort had been undertaken by anyone to revoke the
credentials of the Assad government as the legitimate representative of
Syria in the United Nations, 17 U.N. members, including three of the five
permanent members of the Security Council (the U.S., Great Britain and
France) have recognized an umbrella rebel organization, the Syrian National
Council (SNC), as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. It
should be noted that the rebel group Tahrir al-Sham (formerly known as Al
Nusra, or al-Qaida in Syria), which controls the region surrounding Khan
Shaykhun, is not a member of the SNC, and indeed is engaged in active combat
against forces loyal to the SNC.
The crux of any case in favor of the cruise missile attack on Syria hinges
on the issue of chemical weapons. Syria joined the CWC in September 2013,
following a chemical weapons incident in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghouta_chemical_attack) that allegedly
killed 1,400 civilians (although this number is in dispute). As was the case
in Khan Shaykhun, rebel forces, backed by the U.S. and Europe, attributed
the attack to the Syrian government. The Syrian government blamed the
rebels. Then-President Barack Obama threatened military action in response,
but aborted the attack when evidence pinning the attack on the Syrian
government proved to be less than conclusive. At the behest of Russia, the
U.S. agreed to forestall a military attack in exchange for Syria's accession
to the CWC and its agreement to dispose of all its chemical weapons stocks
and related facilities and equipment.
Importantly, the disarmament of Syria's chemical weapons under the
supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) was codified in a Security Council resolution, 2118 (2013), that
"[d]ecides, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including
unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by
anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter." This language was insisted on by the Russians,
who wanted the Security Council to have to meet and pass a new resolution
authorizing Chapter VII measures, such as military action, to prevent just
the sort of unsanctioned action the U.S. undertook against Shayrat air base
on April 6.
To overcome any objection to the U.S. attack that might be raised on the
grounds of international law, the U.S. would need to prove that Syria was in
violation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), that this violation
represented an ongoing threat to peace, and that, given Russia's record of
support for the Syrian regime, there was no chance of the Security Council
enacting the kind of Chapter VII enforcement required by resolution 2118.
The critical aspect of such a case is, therefore, the intelligence used by
the U.S. to underpin its contention that Syria used chemicals weapons
against Khan Shaykhun on the morning of April 4.
The Trump administration has yet to provide specifics of the intelligence it
relied on to support the allegations levied against Syria. The Pentagon
eventually produced what it claimed to be a radar track of a Syrian
aircraft, believed to be an SU-22 fighter bomber, that took off from Shayrat
airbase and was over Khan Shaykhun at the time of the alleged chemical
attack. This radar track was produced in conjunction with what McMaster
called "our friends and partners and allies around the world", but most
likely derived from a NATO AWACS reconnaissance aircraft flying over Turkey
at the time. According to other U.S. military sources, the same system used
to track the SU-22 aircraft also detected the release of weapons, and the
impact of these weapons on the ground, using infrared (IR) sensors that
detected the heat signatures associated with both events.
According to McMaster, the intelligence linking this documented airstrike to
the chemical incident in Khan Shaykhun was drawn exclusively from images
released by rebel-affiliated media activists, including the "White Helmets,"
and from media reports about observed symptoms by medical personnel who
claimed contact with the victims. At this point, there is no evidence the
U.S. intelligence community used any independent information to corroborate
the reports out of Syria. Instead, a combination of images and alleged
eyewitness accounts from persons under the exclusive control of Tahrir
al-Sham and medical evaluation of persons presented to medical authorities
by Tahrir al-Sham "confirmed" the use of a nerve agent.
Curiously, McMaster also alluded to the existence of unspecified
intelligence information that allowed the U.S. to designate specific areas
within the Shayrat air base that were used to store the sarin nerve agent,
noting that these areas were deliberately not targeted to avoid an
inadvertent release of chemical agents and harm to nearby civilian
communities.
As presented to the public, the intelligence McMaster cited is woefully
inadequate for making a case that Syria used chemical weapons against Khan
Shaykhun. Indeed, the evidence seems to corroborate Syrian and Russian
claims that the SU-22 aircraft used against Khan Shaykhun employed
conventional weapons, and not the chemical weapons the rebels claimed.
The critical evidence is the IR signatures detected by the U.S. and linked
to weapons release over Khan Shaykhun, and to weapons impact on the ground.
Rebel sources make specific reference to four "rockets" being fired by the
Syrian aircraft. These same sources speak of three explosions, and one
"dud-like" noise indicative of a warhead failing to detonate. Video provided
by the rebels shows four distinct weapons impacts for these munitions in
Khan Shaykhun-three showing signatures associated with high explosive events
and one consistent with white smoke.
The use of rockets by the Syrian SU-22 is consistent with the IR sensor
readouts relied upon by the U.S.-only the ignition of a rocket motor would
provide the kind of weapons-release signature the U.S. claims it observed.
There would be zero IR signature associated with the release of a gravity
bomb, whether or not it carried a high explosive or chemical warhead.
Moreover, a chemical warhead, by design, would not produce an IR signature
upon impact. The weapon would either fracture on impact, spreading the agent
contained through inertia, or use a small burster charge inside the weapon
to split the casing and disperse the agent above ground for maximum effect.
In short, it is physically impossible for a chemical weapon to produce the
impact IR signatures detected by the U.S. and linked to the Khan Shaykhun
attack.
The Syrians have a history of employing air-to-ground rockets against rebel
targets from their SU-22 aircraft. Photographs and images from Shayrat
clearly show the presence of smaller S-8 rockets, with 3.9 kilogram high
explosive warheads, and larger S-24 rockets, with 123 kilogram high
explosive warheads. The S-8 rocket also uses a smoke warhead for target
designation purposes. The IR data collected by the U.S., when combined with
the rebel eyewitness statements and video, provides unequivocal
corroboration of the Syrian government's claim that it employed conventional
weapons against Khan Shaykhun.
The video evidence of high-order detonation by at least three of the rocket
impacts is proof positive of a high-explosive payload. The white smoke
observed in the third impact event is consistent with what one would see
from a smoke warhead used to designate the target for attack, a common
air-to-ground tactic familiar to any pilot who has used unguided munitions
in combat. (I qualified as an aerial observer in U.S. Marine Corps OV-10 and
A-4 aircraft, and employed these very tactics when marking targets for
aircraft dropping conventional gravity bombs.)
The high velocity associated with these rockets-more than 600 meters per
second-and their small warhead size makes them ill-suited for chemical
weapons deployment. There is no evidence that either the S-8 or S-24 rockets
have ever been fitted with a chemical warhead. For the U.S. case to hold any
water, Syria would have had to undertake a covert weapons development
program that designed, developed and produced a new class of chemical
warhead possessing zero military value (the small amount of agent able to be
carried, combined with the high impact speeds, makes no military sense).
In addition, the images and first-person narrative relied on by the U.S. to
sustain its conclusion that sarin was used against Khan Shaykhun directly
contradicts the conclusion reached. Victims speak of a "yellow-blue" smoke,
and a pungent odor. Sarin is a colorless, odorless liquid. Furthermore, the
handling of victims by rescuers, dramatically captured on video by the
"White Helmets," shows personnel without any protective equipment
interacting with contaminated individuals. Again, I have received
specialized, live-agent training at the U.S. Army facility at Fort
McClellan, Ala., where hazardous materials technicians are trained to rescue
persons exposed to sarin nerve agent. Any rescuer who handled contaminated
persons in the manner shown on the "White Helmet" video would themselves
become victims. In other words, the video images relied upon by the Trump
administration is actually contraindicative of the presence of sarin nerve
agent at Khan Shaykhun.
Any intelligence analyst worthy of the title, drawing on the information
cited by McMaster, would have reached similar conclusions-that conventional,
high-explosive, air-to-ground rockets were used by the Syrian SU-22 aircraft
against Khan Shaykhun, and that there was a low probability that sarin was
used on victims from the town. (It should be noted that the images of
victims were taken at the "White Helmets" base, after they had been
transported there, and not from the alleged site of the chemical attack.)
There is no disputing that a chemical event occurred that resulted in
victims, many of them children, being treated at the "White Helmets" base.
The evidence used by the U.S. to underpin its assertion that the deaths and
injuries were the result of a chemical weapon containing sarin nerve agent
employed by a Syrian SU-22 originating from Shayrat, however, does not
sustain this allegation. It directly contradicts it.
Russia and Syria have claimed that the Syrian air strike, ostensibly against
a weapons storage facility, caused chemical agents in possession of the
rebels to leak, and that it was these agents that caused the casualties in
Khan Shaykhun. Russia has provided the OPCW with evidence that rebels
affiliated with Tahrir al-Sham had operated a chemical weapons manufacturing
facility in Eastern Aleppo that produced a chlorine-white phosphorus agent
that was used to fill mortar rounds and land mines. To date, the OPCW has
not provided an evaluation of this evidence. When Tahrir al-Sham evacuated
Eastern Aleppo in late 2016, many of its fighters, including those who had
been involved in the chemical weapons manufacturing facility uncovered by
the Russians, moved to Idlib province, where Khan Shaykhun is located.
While the jury is out on the existence of a rebel cache of chemical weapons
in Khan Shaykhun, and whether or not it killed and injured the civilian
victims (many of whom exhibited symptoms of chlorine exposure), one thing is
clear: With the allegation of Syrian government involvement disproved by the
evidence cited by McMaster, the Russian claims remain the only viable
possibility, and as such should be worthy of the kind of international
investigation being called for by Russia and Syria, but opposed by the
United States.
According to McMaster and Mattis, both of whom spoke to the media on April
6-explaining the deliberative processes associated with the decision-making
behind the strike-there was little, if any, questioning of the intelligence
information used to justify military action. Instead, it appears the
question of assigning guilt was resolved early on, and the bulk of the
meetings that transpired focused on assessing military options, and squaring
these options with U.S. policy objectives in Syria.
McMaster describes three briefing interactions with Trump. The first
consisted of an initial briefing about what had transpired in Khan Shaykhun,
which drew on the aforementioned U.S. radar and IR data and the "White
Helmets" victim video and imagery. The next meeting involved a full
gathering of the National Security Council, where military options were
discussed. McMaster describes the interaction between the president and the
NSC as helping the president understand "the degree of agency and control we
have over this very complex situation." The president reportedly asked
questions, and then the NSC withdrew to refine their options, before
presenting the final option-a targeted strike against Shayrat-which Trump
approved.
Even more important than the decision to strike and the nature of that
strike (given the limited nature of the military action) was its
objective-why the U.S. would engage in unilateral military aggression
against a U.N. member state. According to McMaster, the objective was "to
deter the continued use" of chemical weapons by the Syrian government
against a civilian populace by sending a "very strong signal to Assad and
his sponsors (i.e., Russia and Iran) that the United States cannot stand by
as he [Assad] is murdering innocent civilians."
The choice of Shayrat air base was driven by the need for the U.S. to
respond to the "source of this particular attack" in order to "send a strong
message." Military planners picked out a number of targets that, according
to McMaster, "were associated with the ability of that airfield to operate
and continue mass murder attacks against . Syrian civilians." There was some
constraint shown, namely in minimizing risk to any Russian military
personnel and equipment stationed at Shayrat (a Russian special forces unit,
together with an attack helicopter unit, were operating out of the base at
the time of the attack).
"There were also measures put in place," McMaster noted, "to avoid hitting
what we believe is a storage of sarin gas, so that that would not be ignited
and cause a hazard to civilians or anyone else." But this "belief" was
driven by fundamentally flawed assertions derived from inconclusive and
contradictory intelligence. Rather than knowing with absolute certainty the
location of sarin storage units at Shayrat, intelligence analysts were asked
to make their best guess as to where such storage sites could be located if
they existed. This seems to be the extent of any second-tier analysis of the
raw data used to sustain the U.S. contention Syria had employed sarin nerve
agent from the Shayrat air base, designed not to confirm or deny the data in
question, but rather incorporate them as fact into targeting decisions
already made by the president.
The absolute dearth of viable intelligence to sustain the Trump
administration's case for unilateral military action against Syria
completely undermines the moralistic posturing of Ambassador Haley,
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and the president himself about the need
for action. There is no evidence that the Syria government engaged in any
illegal activity in Khan Shaykhun, or anywhere else for that matter,
especially with regard to its obligations under the CWC regarding the
prohibition of chemical weapons. Void of this, the thin rationale the U.S.
could have used to justify a military strike against Syria evaporates,
leaving only one conclusion: The American military strike against Shayrat
air base represents a violation of international law.
Not too many Americans will lose sleep over such a conclusion. Shayrat is
back in operation, with the very SU-22 aircraft involved in the April 4
incident flying missions against targets in and around Khan Shaykhun. Having
publicly committed to both the existence of sarin nerve agent at Shayrat and
the possession of specific intelligence regarding the location of these
weapons in the Shayrat facility, the U.S. has a moral obligation to insist
on a full investigation of that facility in order to identify and eliminate
these weapons. Otherwise, if Syria were to use these weapons in any future
attack (bear in mind that Syria denies their existence), the U.S. would be
as complicit as it claims Russia has been in facilitating the Syrian
government's possession and use of these illegal substances.
Such an investigation will never take place, for several reasons. First, the
U.S. has zero intelligence that would sustain its allegation that Syria
mounted an attack on Khan Shaykhun using sarin nerve agent from the Shayrat
airfield. The American Fourth Estate should be demanding that the Trump
administration back up its claims with something substantive, including
annotated imagery showing where in Shayrat the sarin was stored, mixed and
loaded into munitions-which should be very easy to do, since these areas
were specifically designated not to be targeted in the first place.
But this is an image that does not exist, and indeed cannot exist, since the
U.S. intelligence community has absolutely no information about any such
activity at Shayrat. This reality not only exposes the Trump
administration's case against Syria as an absolute lie. It also exonerates
Russia from the Trump administration's charge that Moscow was complicit in
the attack, given the presence of Russian personnel at Shayrat at the time.
In the aftermath of the cruise missile attack, and in response to Russia's
aggressive promulgation of a counternarrative placing the blame on Tahrir
al-Sham, the White House on Tuesday published a declassified, four-page
memorandum that sought to debunk the Russian claims and paint Russia as
culpable in the chemical attack. The description of the intelligence
underpinning the American assessment did not advance in any significant way
what had already been released by the Trump administration. There was no new
intelligence offered to prove that the U.S. narrative was accurate.
The White House claims the Syrian SU-22 was employed in response to an
offensive launched by Tahrir al-Sham. The Syrian government account that its
aircraft were targeting a weapons storage facility does not contradict this
point. Of interest is the emphasis that the White House placed on an image,
provided by anti-regime activists, of a crater in the middle of a road. The
administration parroted the activist assessment that whatever caused this
crater did not do any damage to surrounding buildings, and as such could not
have caused the leaking of any chemical munitions stored there (although the
militants maintain no such weapons exist). The White House memorandum also
states that the crater was consistent with the impact of a chemical
munition. In fact, the crater is consistent with the impact of a high
explosive warhead from a mortar or air-to-surface rocket (as an artillery
intelligence officer, I specialized in crater analysis of battlefield
munitions).
However, geospacial analysis of the crater in question, with the impact
points recorded on the video by activists, clearly shows that the crater
cited by the White House was not affiliated with the strike carried out by
the Syrian Air Force on the morning of April 4. Either the White House (and
the U.S. intelligence community) has published a hasty and incorrect
analysis, or the passage in question was deliberately released in an effort
to mislead the American public. Again, one must wonder who is driving the
White House narrative, given that so much of the assessment contained in the
four-page memorandum was being driven by information released by Tahrir
al-Sham.
The remainder of the White House memorandum is a replay of previous
statements made by both the Trump and Obama administrations. It is curious
that it stressed the unequivocal presence of sarin nerve agent based upon
second- and third-hand reporting of symptoms. Similar diagnoses were made in
the aftermath of the Ghouta attack in August 2013. International
investigators later corrected the record, noting that some of the symptoms
displayed by victims of that attack were indicative of exposure to some form
of organophosphate, but stopped short of labeling the material involved as
sarin.
That McMaster and the Trump administration feel confident in providing a
specific diagnosis, without the kind of forensic investigation such
conclusions normally require, is indicative of the rush to judgment that has
been the norm when it comes to the incident at Khan Shaykhun.
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