The Death of Arms Control
The Death of Arms Control
Video footage of the Aug. 8, 2019 explosion near Nyonoksa, Russia. (YouTube
screen shot)
A deadly accident in northern Russia earlier this month caused the U.S. arms
control community to stand up and take notice. The Russians claim they were
testing "isotopic sources of fuel on a liquid propulsion unit," and that
only after the test was completed did the engine explode. There was a spike
in radiation levels detected in the city of Severodvinsk, roughly 18 miles
away, shortly after the accident. Seven people were killed as a result of
the explosion, including at least two who died of acute radiation poisoning.
Scores of others were exposed to radioactive materials, and subsequently
decontaminated and placed under observation. Within days, the Russians
declared that all radiation readings in and around the accident site were at
normal levels.
Many Western experts believe that the Russians were testing a
nuclear-powered cruise missile, the 9M730 "Burevestnik"-known in the West by
its NATO designation, the SSC-X-9 "Skyfall"-and that a miniature nuclear
reactor these experts believe was used to power the missile exploded. Other
experts, including me, question this conclusion. But a recent report by
Roshydromet, the Russian agency responsible for sampling air quality, showed
the presence of four distinct isoptopes in the atmosphere after the accident
that are uniquely sourced to the fission of uranium 235, strongly suggesting
that a reactor of some sort was, in fact, involved (mitigating against this
conclusion is the fact that no iodine 131 was detected; iodine 131 is the
most prevalent isotope produced by the fission of uranium 235, and its
absence would be highly unlikely in the event of any reactor explosion).
The bottom line, however, is that no one outside the Russians responsible
for the failed test know exactly what system was being tested, why it was
being tested, how it was being tested, and why that test failed. The Russian
government has refused to provide any details about the test. "When it comes
to activities of a military nature," Russian President Vladimir Putin said
in a press conference a few days after the accident, "there are certain
restrictions on access to information. This is work in the military field,
work on promising weapons systems. We are not hiding this," he said, adding,
"We must think of our own security."
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Others were thinking about their own security as well.
"Something obviously has gone badly wrong here," U.S. national security
adviser John Bolton said after the accident. Bolton observed that Russia is
seeking to "modernize their nuclear arsenal to build new kinds of delivery
vehicles, hypersonic glide vehicles, hypersonic cruise missiles," noting
that "dealing with this capability . remains a real challenge for the United
States and its allies." The U.S. and Russia are currently discussing the
extension of the New START treaty on strategic arms reduction, scheduled to
expire in early 2021. "If there is going to be an extension of the New
START," U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said, "then we need to make sure
that we include all these new weapons that Russia is pursuing."
But this is problematic-the new Russian weapons under development are
directly linked to the decision by the George W. Bush administration in 2002
to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, a 1972 agreement
that limited the number and types of ABM weapons the U.S. and then-Soviet
Union could deploy, thereby increasing the likelihood that any full-scale
missile attack would succeed in reaching its target. By creating the
inevitability of mutual nuclear annihilation (a practice referred to as
"mutually assured destruction," or MAD), both the U.S. and Soviet strategic
nuclear forces served as a deterrent against one another.
The deployment by the U.S. of modern ABM systems in the aftermath of its
withdrawal from the ABM treaty, Russia believes, threatens its strategic
nuclear force and thereby nullifies its deterrent potential. From the
Russian perspective, only by building a new generation of modern nuclear
delivery systems specifically designed to defeat U.S. ABM capability can
Russia reassert its strategic nuclear deterrent. "We have repeatedly told
our American and European partners who are NATO members we will make the
necessary efforts to neutralize the threats posed by the deployment of the
US global missile defense system," Putin stated during a 2018 speech.
According to him, "Nobody really wanted to talk to us about the core of the
problem, and nobody wanted to listen to us." Putin unveiled Russia's new
nuclear arsenal-which included the Burevestnik missile-and stared into the
camera, declaring, "So, listen to us now!"
Complicating matters further is the notion put forward by Esper that the
weapons Putin unveiled in 2018 would require that the New START treaty be
modified prior to any extension, impeding what otherwise would simply have
been an automatic extension, based upon mutual consent, for a five-year
period. The Russians took umbrage over this position. "If we want to really
comprehend the core of the matter," Vladimir Yermakov, Russia's deputy
foreign minister for nonproliferation and arms control, told the Russian
press earlier this month, "it should be noted that the New START Treaty
covers specific categories of strategic arms, including intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs),
heavy bombers and ICBM and SLBM launchers. The Treaty," Yermakov emphasized,
"does not cover any other weapons systems." Regarding the failed test of
Aug. 8, Yermakov declared: "This also concerns the relevant research and
development projects." Yermakov categorically rejected the proposition put
forward by Esper, noting that "the question of hypothetically extending the
New START Treaty with certain weapons systems that do not fit into the
aforementioned categories is absolutely unacceptable."
Esper's position, Yermakov said, did not take the Russians by surprise. "As
of late," Yermakov said, "we have been hearing US officials express doubts
more and more often as to whether extending the New START Treaty makes
sense. It is hard to perceive this as anything other than a conscious effort
to lay the required media groundwork and to invent pretexts for declining to
extend the agreement after it expires in February 2021 and to obtain
absolute freedom to build up the US nuclear arsenal, even to the detriment
of strategic stability and international security."
The Russian position on the extension of the New START treaty, Yermakov
said, is that it would "be a reasonable and responsible step, making it
possible to prevent a complete breakdown in the area of strategic
stability," and "would also provide extra time to consider joint approaches
towards new weapons systems that are currently emerging and possible new
arms control treaties." But before any extension could be considered, the
Russian side insisted that the U.S. resolve an outstanding issue of treaty
compliance that centered around 56 Trident SLBM launchers and 41 B-52H
bombers that were "converted" from their nuclear mission in a way that does
not render them incapable of accomplishing that mission. Such conversions
are permitted under the New START treaty "by rendering [the Trident SLBM
launchers and B-52H bombers] incapable of employing ICBMs, SLBMs, or nuclear
armaments."
For the Trident SLBM launchers, the conversion was done by removing gas
generators of the ejecting mechanism from the launch tube and bolting the
tube covers shut. The problem, for the Russians, is that this procedure is
reversible, meaning that the launcher could still be used to launch SLBMs
simply by removing the bolts and replacing the gas generators. Likewise, the
B-52H modifications involve the removal of launch equipment from the
aircraft. The aircraft still retains a socket that would allow the arming
mechanism of a nuclear weapon to be connected to the removed equipment,
which means the B-52H could be converted back to its nuclear role simply by
reinstalling the equipment. According to Yermakov, "Russian inspectors are
unable to verify the results of the re-equipping under the procedure
stipulated by the Treaty." From the Russian perspective, the issue of the
noncompliant "conversion" of the Trident SLBM launchers and B-52H bombers is
of "fundamental significance"; any extension of the New START can only be
discussed, the Russians maintain, once the United States "fully return to
complying with the spirit and the letter of the treaty."
The foundation upon which U.S.-Russian cooperation regarding New START was
constructed is fragile, founded as it was on the unilateral abrogation of
the ABM Treaty in 2002, the ongoing compliance issue regarding the
conversion of treaty-accountable items under New START, and the precipitous
decision on the part of the Trump administration to withdraw from yet
another landmark arms control agreement, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, which went into effect Aug. 2. It would be the INF Treaty that
would deal the fatal blow to U.S. credibility when it came to arms control.
The U.S. had, since 2014, accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty by
testing a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) to prohibited ranges.
According to the U.S. narrative, Russia took advantage of the existence of
two other missile systems, the Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile and the
Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile, to try and disguise the development of a
new GLCM, the 9M729, which the U.S. claims was flight-tested to ranges
prohibited by the INF Treaty. "Russia probably assumed parallel
development-tested from the same site-and deployment of other cruise
missiles that are not prohibited by the INF Treaty would provide sufficient
cover for its INF violation," then-Director of National Intelligence Dan
Coats told Congress in January.
For its part, Russia denied that the 9M729 violated the INF Treaty. From the
moment the U.S. first raised its allegations regarding the 9M729, Russia
requested that they be backed up with facts that would substantiate the
claims; this the U.S. refused to do. Finally, in an effort to forestall a
precipitous U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty, Russia displayed the 9M729
alongside its cousin, the 9M728, a similar GLCM that the U.S. acknowledges
complies with the range restrictions of the INF Treaty. The Russian Ministry
of Defense invited U.S. and NATO military officers stationed in Moscow to
attend this demonstration; none did. The Russians were able to demonstrate
convincingly that the 9M728 and 9M729 missiles made use of the same
propulsion components-solid-fuel rocket motors, which meant that, all things
being equal, both missiles would fly the same distance. But there was a
kicker-the 9M729 missile was equipped with an improved guidance and control
package, as well as a different warhead which, in their aggregate, weighed
significantly more than their counterpart components on the treaty-compliant
9M728 missile. In short, the Russians demonstrated that the 9M729 could not
fly further than the treaty-compliant 9M728. The U.S. ignored this
demonstration.
At the same time the U.S. was accusing Russia of violating the INF Treaty
with the 9M729 missile, Russia was voicing similar concerns about the Mark
41 "Aegis Ashore" vertical launch system that the U.S. had installed in both
Poland and Romania as part of its ballistic missile defense shield. The Mark
41 originally was designed for service on naval vessels. In this role, its
launcher system could be configured to launch either the SM-6 surface-to-air
missile, or the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile. From the Russian
perspective, the Mark 41, when placed in a ground-launch configuration,
became an INF-capable system, since it could launch a GLCM of proscribed
range. The U.S. was adamant in its rejection of these claims, noting that
the Aegis Ashore systems in Poland and Romania were configured to launch
SM-6 surface-to-air missiles only. The Russians, however, insisted that
there was no physical way to make this determination, noting that the INF
Treaty required that similar systems be denoted with unique visually
distinctive features; the U.S. dismissed the Russian position as a
"technicality."
On Aug. 18, the U.S. conducted a test launch of a GLCM from a Mark 41 launch
cannister that had been bolted to a flat-bed trailer, making it a de facto
ground launcher. The GLCM flew to ranges greater than those permitted by the
INF Treaty. Technically, the U.S. was not in violation of the INF treaty at
the time of the test, because it had expired on Aug. 2, some 16 days prior.
But those 16 days hold the key to understanding just how seriously Russia
took this test. According to a transcript of a meeting Putin held Friday
with members of the Russian Security Council, he declared that by conducting
a missile test a mere 16 days after the INF Treaty ended, it was "obvious
that it was not improvisation, but became the next link in a chain of events
that were planned and carried out earlier."
From the Russian perspective, they had been right all along-the U.S. had
cheated on the INF Treaty, just as they were cheating on the New START
Treaty. With such a dismal track record of noncompliance, it is all but
certain that the New START Treaty will not be extended and, thus liberated
from any vestige of constraint, the U.S. and Russia will embark on a new
arms race that threatens all of humanity with the all-too-real possibility
of imminent destruction.
Scott Ritter
Contributor
Scott Ritter spent more than a dozen years in the intelligence field,
beginning in 1985 as a ground intelligence officer with the US Marine Corps,
where he served with the Marine Corps component of the Rapid.