My concern is that this guy Hussein, at the Intercept, is really, really bad on
Syria. He swallows the Neo Con line completely. And James Risen, who was a hero
when he was fighting giving the names of his news sources to the government,
has turned out, once he got to The Intercept, to be very very establishment,
all in on Russiagate, sort of typical New York Times government spokesman
establishment. And I don't know where they got the leaks from, nor did I have
the patience to start reading the articles today. I went to the Intercept
website and the video wouldn't work for me. But the fact is that I don't think
that Iran was ever a threat to the US, no more than Venezuela or Bolivia or
China or North Korea. No one is or ever was, planning to attack us. Everytime
they talk about a country being a rival or whatever word they use, they're
actually talking about economics, natural resources, whose companies get to
make the most money, who sells oil to whom.
Miriam
-----Original Message-----
From: blind-democracy-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx On Behalf Of Carl Jarvis
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2019 5:17 PM
To: blind-democracy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [blind-democracy] Re: The U.S. Is Setting the Stage for Another Coup
in Iran
If we're using the same "intelligence" that we used to conquer Iraq and
Afghanistan, we might wish that Donald Trump had stayed with building his wall.
Carl Jarvis
On 11/18/19, Miriam Vieni <miriamvieni@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I wonder if there's a connection with the big new leak of documents
about Iran.
Miriam
The U.S. Is Setting the Stage for Another Coup in Iran
The U.S. Is Setting the Stage for Another Coup in Iran Screen shot /
YouTube
This piece originally appeared on Informed Comment.
The crowd protests that grew to affect 100 cities over the weekend in
Iran were sparked by the government increasing the price of gasoline
by as much as 3 times overnight.
But the underlying discontents with the government have been caused by
a sinking economy, expected to shrink by 9% this year.
In turn, Iran's economic woes derive from Donald Trump's economic
blockade of the country, whereby he has virtually halted Iranian oil
sales to countries like Japan, South Korea and Europe, by threatening
consumer nations with US Treasury Department sanctions. Before Trump,
Iran had been exporting 2.5 million barrels a day of petroleum and was
beginning to integrate into the world economy.
Now, after Trump breached the 2015 JCPOA Treaty, Iran has been barred
from much international commerce, the value of its currency has
plummeted, and last May it exported about 300,000 barrels of oil, a
little over a tenth of its pre-Trump production.
Make no mistake. The maximum pressure campaign was plotted out by Mike
Pompeo, John Bolton, and other warmongerers closely tied to the US
arms industries, to Saudi Arabia and to the Israel lobbies, all of
which would like to see the Iranian regime overthrown and the exercise
of US military power in that country.
The campaign aims at regime change, and the social unrest it has
succeeded in provoking is testimony to the deadly efficiency of the
blockade. A physical blockade is an act of war in international law,
but this economic blockade comes to the same thing.
The situation eerily resembles that in summer, 1953. In 1951, Iran had
nationalized its oil facilities, after the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
(BP) declined to pay what Iran thought was a fair price for its
petroleum. In the wake of the oil nationalization, elderly
conservative nationalist Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected prime minister
by parliament because of popular support for Iran asserting ownership
of its own oil resources. The British were completely expelled from
Iran.
In response, US President Eisenhower and UK Prime Minister Anthony
Eden coordinated a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil. The US put severe
pressure on Japan and Italy not to wildcat and buy it on the world market.
As Nikki Keddie wrote in Roots of Revolution, oilman Max Thorberg
wrote in
1953 to Claire Booth Luce, the US ambassador to Italy that if Rome
took more Iranian petroleum the US oil majors would take revenge on
Italy:
The severe boycott of Iranian oil exports plunged the country's
economy into crisis and stirred popular resentments, so that
Mosaddegh's popularity sank to ever new lows within two years. By
summer of 1953, his position was so weakened that the US Central
Intelligence Agency was able to network with conservative Iranian
officiers, clergy and others to connive at a bloody military coup
against Mosaddegh.
The US Embassy in Iran reported popular discontent with Mosaddegh at
the beginning of July, 1953, because of the deteriorating economy, but
managed rather dishonestly to avoid mentioning that the US-led
economic boycott of Iranian petroleum was the cause of that
deterioration in Iranians' standard of living:
"Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954 .
Tehran, July 1, 1953.233. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the
Department of States . SUBJECT: Popularity and Prestige of Prime
Minister Mohammed Mosadeq
Introduction
The Embassy has lately been receiving reports tending to indicate that
Prime Minister Mosadeq has lost much of the popular support which he
previously enjoyed. Without the means or possibility of employing
scientific public opinion polling techniques, it is of course
impossible to draw definite conclusions, but the comments received may
reveal a broad trend.
Original Support and Its Decline
There seems to be no question of the broad base of popular support for Dr.
Mosadeq at the time he first took office as Prime Minister. As leader
of the struggle against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in a country
where resentment and even hatred of the British is deep-rooted,
Mosadeq could count upon the support of people from all levels of
society with but few exceptions. For many months after oil
nationalization, the Prime Minister's popularity continually mounted.
To the common people, Mosadeq was looked upon almost as a demigod.
The phenomenon of Mosadeq was almost unique in Iran. The figure of a
frail, old man, in an Oriental country where age of itself commands
respect, who appeared to be successfully winning a battle against
tremendous odds, aroused the sympathy of almost all Iranians. In a
country where political corruption had been the accepted norm, there
now appeared a man whose patriotism and financial honesty were unassailable.
The economic and financial situation of the country, however,
continued to worsen and as opposition to him increased, the Prime
Minister found it ever more necessary to adopt arbitrary means to
silence it. The contradictions in his public statements and promises
continued to become more glaringly apparent. While speaking of an
"oilless economy" on the one hand the Prime Minister excused his
failure to initiate promised reforms on the ground that he could not
"fight on two fronts," The much promised "oil solution", which was
constantly dangled before the people, failed to materialize. More and
more demands for dictatorial powers were made, and more and more the
Prime Minister was compelled to employ arbitrary and high-handed
methods to keep himself in power.
For months Mosadeq failed to leave his residence for fear of his life.
He admitted fear of crowds. No longer was he able to address "the
people" in parliament square. His speeches were delivered from his bed
into a recording machine and played back over Radio Tehran. He did not
dare make a public appearance. Mosadeq was no longer the popular hero.
The Prime Minister finally made it clear that he intended to remain in
office regardless of popular support. With the backing of a minority
of deputies, it was now he who could use the threat of obstructionist tactics.
He warned that he would remain in office as long as he had a simple
majority in parliament of one-half plus one. He no longer demanded
overwhelming votes of confidence. It was clear as well that, if he
were not sure of obtaining one-half plus one, his faithful group of
deputies could simply hold up proceedings by merely walking out of the
parliamentary assembly. He has now gone a step further and threatened
the dissolution of the Majlis. ."
Popularity of Prime Minister
As to the Prime Minister's popularity the following comments are revealing.
April 7 the Consul at Tabriz sent a message to the Embassy which
stated that it was apparent the Prime Minister's hold over Azerbaijan
had "weakened visibly" during the previous two months. The Consul
noted an increasing amount of publicly expressed opposition to Mosadeq
indicating a decline in his personal prestige, and that the attempt of
the Prime Minister to undermine the Throne had resulted in increasing
the Shah's prestige "to the detriment of Mosadeq".
In a letter dated April 1, 1953, the Consul at Isfahan made the
following
comment:
"I think I should report that for many weeks now people with whom I
have talked have spoken with growing dissatisfaction about Dr. Mosadeq
and the 'government' in general. Articulate persons are dissatisfied
with lack of accomplishment, non-progress toward settlement of the oil
controversy, new taxes and regulations governing foreign commerce.
They talk mysteriously of a coming change in Tehran, that matters
cannot go on as at present. This comment is not meant to be a public
opinion poll, but just a report of comments and the thinking of some
of the 'better class' people with whom I have talked.".
By August 19, 1953, there were nation-wide crowd protests, with
leftists pitted against American rent-a-crowds chanting their demand
that Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlevi, who had fled to Italy, return to the country.
The New York Times News Service reported that day, "Police and
soldiers swung into action tonight against Tudeh (Communist) parrisans
and Nationalist extremists . . . The troops appeared to be in a kind
of frenzy as they smashed into the rioters with clubbed rifles, tear
gas bombs and nightsticks . . . The rioting surged through the
downtown area [of Tehran] tonight as the extreme Nationalist
Pan-Iranists, armed with metal-tipped wooden spears, sought to avenge
the torching of their headquarters by Tudeh gangs in the morning."
Actually, the pro-Mosaddegh forces were not Communists, and by then
the Tudeh Party had largely broken with Mosaddegh. And the so-called
"extreme Nationalists" were just paid for by US secret agent Kermit
Roosevelt (a cousin of FDR).
These crowd protests and clashes were a prelude to the
CIA-orchestrated coup the removed Mosaddegh from office, placed him
under house arrest till his death a few years later, and brought back
the Shah or king as a capitalist dictator who moderated Iran's oil
prices in the service of Washington DC until he was overthrown in
1979.
So that's how it is done folks. First, a complete economic blockade on
a country's exports, then tut-tutting at how the government seems to
have become unpopular in the face of economic deterioration, and then
some furtive meetings with seedy far-right-wing militarists and the
spreading around of money to create crows protests, and then the coup
on behalf of imperial interests.
I'm not suggesting that the crowds in today's Iran are being paid to
be out there; on the contrary, I'm quite sure that they are severely
distressed.
You could blame some of the unrest on unpopular economic and social
policies of the regime that might have been enacted even with no US
blockade. But I am suggesting that the primary cause of the distress
is a Trump plot on the Iranian economy that looks an awful lot like
what was done in 1951-1953 to put Iran back under the thumb of
Washington and Big Oil.
Juan Cole
Contributor
Juan Cole is the Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History
at the University of Michigan and the proprietor of the Informed Comment
e-zine.