[AR] Re: nuclear policy (was Re: Alternative propulsion...)
- From: Henry Spencer <hspencer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: Arocket List <arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 29 Dec 2019 21:56:13 -0500 (EST)
On Sat, 28 Dec 2019, Norman Yarvin wrote:
Herbert York's book "The Advisors" argues persuasively that in hindsight,
Oppenheimer was right, and Teller wrong, about the "super"...
Also, when the Teller-Ulam concept came along, Oppenheimer was in favor
of developing it. ... That makes clear the basis of Oppenheimer's
opposition to the classical Super: it was mostly that he didn't think it
could work.
No, this is a misunderstanding. The GAC report which opposed superbomb
development admits difficulties and uncertainties, but says: "...we
believe that an imaginative and concerted attack on the problem has a
better than even chance of producing the weapon within five years."
(York observes that this was a remarkably accurate prediction: four years
and four months later, the first combat-ready superbomb was fired in the
Castle Bravo test. The report's prediction that many development tests
might be needed was less accurate.)
Note also that it wasn't just Oppenheimer who was opposed to superbomb
development -- it was the unanimous position of the 8-member GAC, although
there was some disagreement on whether this should be conditional on a
Soviet commitment to also refrain (Fermi and Rabi favored this; Conant,
Rowe, Smith, DuBridge, Buckley, and Oppenheimer preferred an unconditional
commitment). But it wasn't later used against any of the others.
By the time Ulam had his epiphany (and Teller improved on it), the basic
decision had long since been made, and promptly reinforced by the start of
the Korean War. The chance to show restraint had been lost.
Henry
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