Henry,
Re: your response to point #2, I had a friend a few years back who made a
similar suggestion (in a rather pithy way). To paraphrase: "In order to
help our country win an important Cold War battle, the Army gave up it's
crown jewels (Redstone Arsenal) to NASA. The Cold War is over now, so NASA
should give it back." His suggestion was to take the launcher part of MSFC
and explicitly give it back to the military for something like missile
defense work or prompt global strike. Even if they took most of their share
of NASA's budget with them when they left, at least they'd take away the
rot that is NASA in-house launch vehicle development programs.
~Jon
On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 1:46 PM, Henry Vanderbilt <hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
wrote:
On 2/8/2018 5:51 AM, Bill Bruner wrote:
The wild card here is the President's strong desire to return to the Moon
sooner, rather than later. The /only/ way to do that at the beginning of
the second term (with substantial progress in the first) is with FH.
Yes - my speculations on what could be achieved with an FH booster and
existing LH2 engines are very much made in that context.
To modify Henry V.'s grand bargain, here is how the Administration can cut
this Gordian knot:
1. Immediately make the policy decision to return to the Moon
permanently, starting with a FH centric architecture, by the early 20s.
Still in violent agreement. Make clear of course that all are welcome to
bid for slices of the transport and systems needs as they evolve over time,
but that near-term low-risk demonstrated capability will always outweigh
elegant viewgraphs.
2. Transition from SLS at Marshall to FH-compatible lunar lander and DSG
contracts, while significantly expanding the nuclear thermal propulsion
work they're already doing there <https://www.nasa.gov/centers/
marshall/news/news/releases/2017/nasa-contracts-with-bwxt-nu
clear-energy-to-advance-nuclear-thermal-propulsion-technology.html>. The
strategic defense work is coming, but the architecture is yet undefined, so
it is probably too early to use it as part of this deal - plus any new MDA
work would be at SMDC, not Marshall - resulting in politically problematic
layoffs at MSFC.
Fundamental disagreement, in that in my estimation, asking current MSFC
management to accomplish anything vital to a program dooms that program.
All the tea leaves point to their having become terminally unsalvageably
bureaucratically dysfunctional at this point. They've spent decades now
learning how to spend billions per year "developing" nothing usefully
flyable. The only practical thing to do with them is NOD them out and move
on.
Yes, it will involve some serious political heavy lifting. No, the
previous Administration's failed attempt to do so does not prove it
impossible - that White House never made a serious attempt at deal-making,
simply sent Congress a proposal that Congress predictably rejected and
counter-attacked, then shrugged and moved on to things they cared more
about.
Money for tech employment in a Congressional district is fungible - the
amount matters more than the exact path.
The new money coming via SMDC rather than MSFC is a feature, not a bug, in
that it supports lateral transfer of competent local white-collar workforce
away from the terminally dysfunctional management structure.
And the time-phasing of the transition can be horse-traded to minimize
local economic disruption - at some cost in program efficiency, yes, but
that sort of thing is inevitable in Congressional funding politics.
3. Work with the Hill and industry to come up with an intentional plan to
transition Station to the private sector by the end of the second term
rather than "cancelling" it.
Everything Takes Longer & Costs More. I'm not sure that Station will be
ready for the private sector that soon - if ever.
Rather, encourage co-orbital private sector development, till eventually
the most practical thing to do with Station is turn it into a museum.
Also, the NASA Station establishment is demonstrably less dysfunctional
than MSFC - they're actually flying something for their $4G/year - but not
hugely so. And they're politically more powerful. Perhaps best to leave
them as-is, both to avoid unnecessary additional political heavy lifting,
and to allow the new deep-space initiative to be run by a new and far more
lean & dynamic organization.
Within the current NASA topline, this would a) get us back to the Moon
sooner b) free up SLS and Station money to do something useful c) build a
gateway to the rest of the Solar System and d) put us on a pathway to a
serious interplanetary drive.
Very little difference in our overall vectors here...
Henry V
On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 9:22 PM, Henry Vanderbilt <
hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
On 2/7/2018 8:16 PM, Henry Spencer wrote:
It will take time for a substantial heavylift market to develop.
Time, or a high-volume government customer. Say, a serious human
deep-space exploration program that actually wanted to accomplish
something interesting for the ~$4G/year that's the likely max
politically-practical funding.
Henry V