Interesting point - yes, Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville and its resident
Army Ballistic Missile Agency, AKA Von Braun's rocket team, were folded
into NASA back at NASA's start in 1958.
I can see the Army wanting the land and some of the buildings and
facilities back.
But if the current MSFC management structure is also part of the
package, the Army would be wise to refuse. Run away!
What the US Army gave up back in 1958 was a functioning highly efficient
heavy rocket development team. What they'd be getting back would be the
60-years distant bureaucratized descendant, vastly bloated and utterly
dysfunctional. The Army's got enough problems already.
No, I still think the only practical thing to do with the current MSFC
management structure is send them to the land of NOD. Cut most of their
funding and all of their operational responsibilities and task them with
reviewing each other's paperwork. Provide plenty of opportunities for
any remaining talent with initiative to go elsewhere and be productive,
then let the rest while away the time till retirement.
My bottom line: The current MSFC management structure should not be
allowed near ANY task that might be important to accomplish in finite
time for finite money.
Henry V
On 2/8/2018 10:33 PM, Jonathan Goff wrote:
Henry,
Re: your response to point #2, I had a friend a few years back who made a similar suggestion (in a rather pithy way). To paraphrase: "In order to help our country win an important Cold War battle, the Army gave up it's crown jewels (Redstone Arsenal) to NASA. The Cold War is over now, so NASA should give it back." His suggestion was to take the launcher part of MSFC and explicitly give it back to the military for something like missile defense work or prompt global strike. Even if they took most of their share of NASA's budget with them when they left, at least they'd take away the rot that is NASA in-house launch vehicle development programs.
~Jon
On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 1:46 PM, Henry Vanderbilt <hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
On 2/8/2018 5:51 AM, Bill Bruner wrote:
The wild card here is the President's strong desire to return to
the Moon sooner, rather than later. The /only/ way to do that
at the beginning of the second term (with substantial progress
in the first) is with FH.
Yes - my speculations on what could be achieved with an FH booster
and existing LH2 engines are very much made in that context.
To modify Henry V.'s grand bargain, here is how the
Administration can cut this Gordian knot:
1. Immediately make the policy decision to return to the Moon
permanently, starting with a FH centric architecture, by the
early 20s.
Still in violent agreement. Make clear of course that all are
welcome to bid for slices of the transport and systems needs as they
evolve over time, but that near-term low-risk demonstrated
capability will always outweigh elegant viewgraphs.
2. Transition from SLS at Marshall to FH-compatible lunar lander
and DSG contracts, while significantly expanding the nuclear
thermal propulsion work they're already doing there
<https://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/news/news/releases/2017/nasa-contracts-with-bwxt-nuclear-energy-to-advance-nuclear-thermal-propulsion-technology.html
<https://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/news/news/releases/2017/nasa-contracts-with-bwxt-nuclear-energy-to-advance-nuclear-thermal-propulsion-technology.html>>.
The strategic defense work is coming, but the architecture is
yet undefined, so it is probably too early to use it as part of
this deal - plus any new MDA work would be at SMDC, not
Marshall - resulting in politically problematic layoffs at MSFC.
Fundamental disagreement, in that in my estimation, asking current
MSFC management to accomplish anything vital to a program dooms that
program. All the tea leaves point to their having become terminally
unsalvageably bureaucratically dysfunctional at this point. They've
spent decades now learning how to spend billions per year
"developing" nothing usefully flyable. The only practical thing to
do with them is NOD them out and move on.
Yes, it will involve some serious political heavy lifting. No, the
previous Administration's failed attempt to do so does not prove it
impossible - that White House never made a serious attempt at
deal-making, simply sent Congress a proposal that Congress
predictably rejected and counter-attacked, then shrugged and moved
on to things they cared more about.
Money for tech employment in a Congressional district is fungible -
the amount matters more than the exact path.
The new money coming via SMDC rather than MSFC is a feature, not a
bug, in that it supports lateral transfer of competent local
white-collar workforce away from the terminally dysfunctional
management structure.
And the time-phasing of the transition can be horse-traded to
minimize local economic disruption - at some cost in program
efficiency, yes, but that sort of thing is inevitable in
Congressional funding politics.
3. Work with the Hill and industry to come up with an
intentional plan to transition Station to the private sector by
the end of the second term rather than "cancelling" it.
Everything Takes Longer & Costs More. I'm not sure that Station
will be ready for the private sector that soon - if ever.
Rather, encourage co-orbital private sector development, till
eventually the most practical thing to do with Station is turn it
into a museum.
Also, the NASA Station establishment is demonstrably less
dysfunctional than MSFC - they're actually flying something for
their $4G/year - but not hugely so. And they're politically more
powerful. Perhaps best to leave them as-is, both to avoid
unnecessary additional political heavy lifting, and to allow the new
deep-space initiative to be run by a new and far more lean & dynamic
organization.
Within the current NASA topline, this would a) get us back to
the Moon sooner b) free up SLS and Station money to do something
useful c) build a gateway to the rest of the Solar System and d)
put us on a pathway to a serious interplanetary drive.
Very little difference in our overall vectors here...
Henry V
On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 9:22 PM, Henry Vanderbilt
<hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
<mailto:hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<mailto:hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>>> wrote:
On 2/7/2018 8:16 PM, Henry Spencer wrote:
It will take time for a substantial heavylift market to
develop.
Time, or a high-volume government customer. Say, a serious
human
deep-space exploration program that actually wanted to
accomplish
something interesting for the ~$4G/year that's the likely max
politically-practical funding.
Henry V