[AR] Re: Future Exploration Policy (was Re: Re: Congrats SpaceX
- From: Henry Vanderbilt <hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2018 13:46:33 -0700
On 2/8/2018 5:51 AM, Bill Bruner wrote:
The wild card here is the President's strong desire to return to the
Moon sooner, rather than later. The /only/ way to do that at the
beginning of the second term (with substantial progress in the first) is
with FH.
Yes - my speculations on what could be achieved with an FH booster and
existing LH2 engines are very much made in that context.
To modify Henry V.'s grand bargain, here is how the Administration can
cut this Gordian knot:
1. Immediately make the policy decision to return to the Moon
permanently, starting with a FH centric architecture, by the early 20s.
Still in violent agreement. Make clear of course that all are welcome
to bid for slices of the transport and systems needs as they evolve over
time, but that near-term low-risk demonstrated capability will always
outweigh elegant viewgraphs.
2. Transition from SLS at Marshall to FH-compatible lunar lander and DSG
contracts, while significantly expanding the nuclear thermal propulsion
work they're already doing there
<https://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/news/news/releases/2017/nasa-contracts-with-bwxt-nuclear-energy-to-advance-nuclear-thermal-propulsion-technology.html>.
The strategic defense work is coming, but the architecture is yet
undefined, so it is probably too early to use it as part of this deal -
plus any new MDA work would be at SMDC, not Marshall - resulting in
politically problematic layoffs at MSFC.
Fundamental disagreement, in that in my estimation, asking current MSFC
management to accomplish anything vital to a program dooms that program.
All the tea leaves point to their having become terminally
unsalvageably bureaucratically dysfunctional at this point. They've
spent decades now learning how to spend billions per year "developing"
nothing usefully flyable. The only practical thing to do with them is
NOD them out and move on.
Yes, it will involve some serious political heavy lifting. No, the
previous Administration's failed attempt to do so does not prove it
impossible - that White House never made a serious attempt at
deal-making, simply sent Congress a proposal that Congress predictably
rejected and counter-attacked, then shrugged and moved on to things they
cared more about.
Money for tech employment in a Congressional district is fungible - the
amount matters more than the exact path.
The new money coming via SMDC rather than MSFC is a feature, not a bug,
in that it supports lateral transfer of competent local white-collar
workforce away from the terminally dysfunctional management structure.
And the time-phasing of the transition can be horse-traded to minimize
local economic disruption - at some cost in program efficiency, yes, but
that sort of thing is inevitable in Congressional funding politics.
3. Work with the Hill and industry to come up with an intentional plan
to transition Station to the private sector by the end of the second
term rather than "cancelling" it.
Everything Takes Longer & Costs More. I'm not sure that Station will be
ready for the private sector that soon - if ever.
Rather, encourage co-orbital private sector development, till eventually
the most practical thing to do with Station is turn it into a museum.
Also, the NASA Station establishment is demonstrably less dysfunctional
than MSFC - they're actually flying something for their $4G/year - but
not hugely so. And they're politically more powerful. Perhaps best to
leave them as-is, both to avoid unnecessary additional political heavy
lifting, and to allow the new deep-space initiative to be run by a new
and far more lean & dynamic organization.
Within the current NASA topline, this would a) get us back to the Moon
sooner b) free up SLS and Station money to do something useful c) build
a gateway to the rest of the Solar System and d) put us on a pathway to
a serious interplanetary drive.
Very little difference in our overall vectors here...
Henry V
On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 9:22 PM, Henry Vanderbilt
<hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
On 2/7/2018 8:16 PM, Henry Spencer wrote:
It will take time for a substantial heavylift market to develop.
Time, or a high-volume government customer. Say, a serious human
deep-space exploration program that actually wanted to accomplish
something interesting for the ~$4G/year that's the likely max
politically-practical funding.
Henry V
Other related posts: