[AR] Re: Mills Fuel Experiment
- From: Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 08:15:10 +0000
On 20/03/15 05:08, James Bowery wrote:
The link you provided, dated 1/14/14 criticizes a poor quality press
release.
I also posted virtually same criticism of that press release on 1/14/14:
https://www.mail-archive.com/vortex-l@xxxxxxxxxx/msg88835.html
and
https://www.mail-archive.com/vortex-l@xxxxxxxxxx/msg88836.html
That press release cannot be taken as representative of the theory, let
alone demonstration that the theory implies violation of conservation of
energy.
The energy balance numbers are clearly stated for the case of fractional
rydberg state 1/4 as 2.78 GJ/kg, in slide 42 of the BLP business
presentation PDF:
Calculations: H2O to H2(1/4) + 1/2O 2 (50MJ/mole or 2.78 GJ/kg, 2.78
GJ/liter)
It looks like 5 metric tonnes of rocket thrust for a kg/sec fuel
consumption results from an optimistic (100% efficient) calculation,
assuming only the oxygen can be ionized and "grabbed" via MHD/EHD as
exhaust:
sqrt(2.78GJ/(16/18)kg)?m/s
sqrt((2.78 * [giga*joule]) / ([16 / 18] * [kilo*gramm])) ? meter / second
= 55924.056 m/s
That's the impossible.
I edit a semi-fun-semi-serious cryptography page with a list of
principles for secure systems design - an excerpt is below. From time to
time crypto and security people send in suggestions, which I may or may
not add.
Recently I got a short list of suggestions from a very respected
cryptographer/security expert, including this one:
"People offering something that does the impossible are lying."
No, I mused, perhaps they may just be mistaken?
No, he replied, they are lying. Always.
-- Peter Fairbrother
First Principle: If data isn't collected, it can't be stolen.
Second Principle: Only people you trust can betray you.
Third Principle: Never underestimate the attention, risk, money and time
that an opponent will put into reading traffic (Robert Morris).
Fourth Principle: Keep it simple. The more complex it is, the more
places there are to attack.
Fifth Principle. Modes and choices are bad in crypto protocols, they
give users choices they are not qualified to make. It is your job to be
clever, not the user's.
When a user of a communications system makes a bad security choice, it
directly affects everyone who communicates with him; and indirectly it
affects everyone else who uses the system.
Sixth Principle. A system which is hard to use either doesn't get used,
or it gets misused. Good user interfaces are essential.
Users don't actually read the manual; so don't expect them to.
Seventh Principle: Leaving holes to let "good governments" in will
inevitably leave holes for others as well. (Jerry Leichter)
Eighth Principle: In code, assume nothing ever really goes away. (Jerry
Leichter)
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