[AR] Re: Mills Fuel Experiment
- From: James Bowery <jabowery@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: arocket <arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 12:27:36 -0500
Arguing against arithmetic showing specific energy that is orders of
magnitude lower than nuclear by parading a litany of rhetorical if not
polemical "wisdom", isn't even wrong.
On Fri, Mar 20, 2015 at 3:15 AM, Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
> On 20/03/15 05:08, James Bowery wrote:
>
>> The link you provided, dated 1/14/14 criticizes a poor quality press
>> release.
>>
>> I also posted virtually same criticism of that press release on 1/14/14:
>>
>> https://www.mail-archive.com/vortex-l@xxxxxxxxxx/msg88835.html
>> and
>> https://www.mail-archive.com/vortex-l@xxxxxxxxxx/msg88836.html
>>
>> That press release cannot be taken as representative of the theory, let
>> alone demonstration that the theory implies violation of conservation of
>> energy.
>>
>> The energy balance numbers are clearly stated for the case of fractional
>> rydberg state 1/4 as 2.78 GJ/kg, in slide 42 of the BLP business
>> presentation PDF:
>>
>> Calculations: H2O to H2(1/4) + 1/2O 2 (50MJ/mole or 2.78 GJ/kg, 2.78
>> GJ/liter)
>> It looks like 5 metric tonnes of rocket thrust for a kg/sec fuel
>> consumption results from an optimistic (100% efficient) calculation,
>> assuming only the oxygen can be ionized and "grabbed" via MHD/EHD as
>> exhaust:
>>
>> sqrt(2.78GJ/(16/18)kg)?m/s
>> sqrt((2.78 * [giga*joule]) / ([16 / 18] * [kilo*gramm])) ? meter / second
>> = 55924.056 m/s
>>
>
> That's the impossible.
>
>
>
> I edit a semi-fun-semi-serious cryptography page with a list of principles
> for secure systems design - an excerpt is below. From time to time crypto
> and security people send in suggestions, which I may or may not add.
>
> Recently I got a short list of suggestions from a very respected
> cryptographer/security expert, including this one:
>
> "People offering something that does the impossible are lying."
>
> No, I mused, perhaps they may just be mistaken?
>
> No, he replied, they are lying. Always.
>
>
> -- Peter Fairbrother
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> First Principle: If data isn't collected, it can't be stolen.
>
> Second Principle: Only people you trust can betray you.
>
> Third Principle: Never underestimate the attention, risk, money and time
> that an opponent will put into reading traffic (Robert Morris).
>
> Fourth Principle: Keep it simple. The more complex it is, the more places
> there are to attack.
>
> Fifth Principle. Modes and choices are bad in crypto protocols, they give
> users choices they are not qualified to make. It is your job to be clever,
> not the user's.
>
> When a user of a communications system makes a bad security choice, it
> directly affects everyone who communicates with him; and indirectly it
> affects everyone else who uses the system.
>
> Sixth Principle. A system which is hard to use either doesn't get used, or
> it gets misused. Good user interfaces are essential.
>
> Users don't actually read the manual; so don't expect them to.
>
> Seventh Principle: Leaving holes to let "good governments" in will
> inevitably leave holes for others as well. (Jerry Leichter)
>
> Eighth Principle: In code, assume nothing ever really goes away. (Jerry
> Leichter)
>
>
>
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